Issue No. 01The Field ManualFree of charge

What did your AI
accidentally ship?

A free, passive security review for web applications written with Lovable, Cursor, Replit, v0, Bolt — or by hand, in an evening, with Supabase open in the next tab. Submit a URL; receive a graded report in approximately thirty seconds.

Reviewed in approx. 30 seconds. Free of charge. Confidential.
Supabase
Firebase
Clerk
Convex
Neon
Vercel
Next.js
50+ patterns
From the editor

A short note before reading.

The tools are very good. The defaults are catastrophic. Lovable will happily wire your service-role key into the frontend bundle and tell you the build succeeded. Cursor will scaffold a Firebase project with allow read, write: if true, because that is what the quickstart says, and never warn you. v0 will paste your OpenAI key in plaintext and call the result production-ready.

Most builders have no idea — until someone tells them, or someone exploits it. vybckr is the first thing that tells you. Free, passive, in thirty seconds, before someone else figures it out.1

1 If somebody else already has, they will not be writing in.

Method, in five chapters

The catalogue of avoidable ways an AI-built application is opened.

Each chapter is a family of checks. Approximately thirty in total. All passive: nothing authenticated, nothing written, nothing brute-forced.

I.

Secrets, accidentally publicised

Service-role tokens, Stripe live keys, OpenAI credentials, GitHub PATs, JWT-signed admin tokens. Lifted from your JavaScript bundle, source maps, environment files, and HTML head, where the model placed them and never thought about it again.

Searched against fifty-plus signature patterns.
II.

Databases, left ajar

Supabase tables readable without authentication. Firestore rule files still reading allow read, write: if true. Postgres REST endpoints honouring anonymous queries. We probe fifteen common table names and the OpenAPI dump.

Reading is not breaking. We read what your app already serves.
III.

Authentication, half-installed

Anonymous sign-up never disabled. Clerk public keys whose payload reveals user metadata. Convex endpoints accepting unvalidated input. Defaults appropriate to development, never reviewed before production.

Configuration is policy by another name.
IV.

Storage, with the door propped

Supabase Storage buckets enumerable to anonymous clients. Firebase Storage discoverable. S3 returning bucket names through a CORS misconfiguration. The "private avatars" folder that is, in practice, an index.

A name is a beginning.
V.

Frameworks, in their unfortunate defaults

Vercel preview deployments leaking environment variables. Next.js source maps available in production. The .env file served as a 200 OK. Cookies missing the Secure flag. Headers expected and quietly absent.

A defect of imagination, not of code.
The full reference, with severities and remedies, is filed under /docs.
The casebook

Three short specimens, names redacted.

All three were observed on production sites. None were theoretical. The bugs are reproducible at the date of writing.

Specimen №01
Lovable + Supabase
F

Stripe live secret in window.__ENV

A B2B SaaS shipped sk_live_… directly in the React bundle. Anyone reading the page source could refund any customer.

Found in
4 seconds
Fixed in
4 minutes
Specimen №02
YC fintech
F

Forty thousand user emails read in one request

The users table had no Row-Level Security policy. /rest/v1/users?select=email,name returned the full member list to any caller with the (public) anon key.

Found in
11 seconds
Fixed in
10 minutes
Specimen №03
Cursor + Firebase
D

allow read, write: if true — in production

A marketplace launched with the Firebase quickstart rule still in place. The orders collection was world-writeable.

Found in
8 seconds
Fixed in
15 minutes
Procedure

Three steps. No login. Nothing installed.

The full method is documented at /how-it-works. The summary is short.

i.

Submit a URL

Any public site. We treat it the way a stranger would on day one — passive recon, nothing authenticated.

ii.

We probe in real time

Bundle inspection, header sweep, vendor fingerprinting, vendor-specific deep dives. Streaming, ~30 seconds.

iii.

We issue a grade

Each finding ships with plain-English impact and a one-paragraph fix. Re-scan after fixing. Share if you want.

Eligibility

If your stack started with a prompt, you qualify.

Lovable, Cursor, Bolt, v0, Replit Agent — or a hand-rolled Next.js project where you wired Supabase yourself in an evening. Not because the tools are bad. Because the security defaults have not caught up to how quickly the tools ship.

Correspondence

A small selection of reasonable questions, with answers.

01.Is vybckr actually free?

Yes. The scan is free, no signup, no credit card.

02.Do you store my URL or scan results?

We store the result so you can share a link. Result pages are noindex by default. Deletion on request.

03.What if I don't own the site I'm scanning?

A Quick Scan only looks at your public surface — the same as opening DevTools in a browser. We never log in, never POST.

04.How is this different from Snyk, Sentry, or a real pentest?

Snyk scans dependencies. Sentry catches errors. A pentest costs $5–25k. We catch the specific things AI builders ship by accident.

05.Will this find every security issue?

No. We catch the catastrophic, beginner-mistake stuff that AI tools generate by default. Logic bugs need a human.

06.Who built this?

BotBrained. We ship AI-leverage tools for indie builders. vybckr is free because the most-asked question we hear is "is my Lovable app safe?"

Submit a URL

Thirty seconds. No signup. No catch.

Find out what the model wrote into your bundle while you weren't looking.

Reviewed in approx. 30 seconds. Free of charge. Confidential.